If you’re in the tech business, you probably think you’re above government snooping.
If you’ve been following the news lately, though, you might not realize that the NSA can and does collect vast amounts of data about your activities, from your social networks to your browsing habits.
The agency has used that data to build up databases of every single person who has ever visited a website and what they’ve done.
The data is stored on servers in Fort Meade, Maryland, and the National Security Agency’s top secret supercomputer in Fort Gordon, Georgia, and can be accessed by anyone who wants to get their hands on it.
And while it’s a fairly new phenomenon, the agency has been using this information for years to build a broad surveillance apparatus.
When you think of it, the NSA isn’t even the largest private company that collects and stores data.
Its largest customer is Google, which is known for collecting and storing a vast amount of information about its users.
And although it’s still unclear exactly how the NSA gets all of its data, the documents and documents released this week by the German newspaper Der Spiegel reveal that the agency doesn’t use a single piece of software to access the vast amount it collects.
Instead, the information that the government is getting from these companies is stored as a set of files called a SIGINT data base.
In other words, it’s not a list of URLs and search terms that can be downloaded and run by anyone.
Rather, it is a set to which the NSA has given its permission.
In many ways, that makes it a much more secure and effective collection system.
The NSA has access to a lot of information from the companies it’s using to access its data.
In a world where you have no privacy protections, this data is useful.
But in a world that requires a lot more privacy, it makes it harder for the agency to collect valuable information, like the content of emails, that might otherwise be a crime against the country.
The SIGINT program has evolved over time and its reach has expanded over time.
In the late 1980s, the government had about a billion dollars of cash in the bank, which could allow it to spend whatever it wanted on surveillance and other programs.
But by the 1990s, with the advent of the internet, that money dried up.
And then, in 2005, the US began a massive national debate about how the government should use its billions of dollars to build its own spying infrastructure.
In 2006, Congress approved legislation called the USA Freedom Act, which authorized the NSA to obtain and use a much broader range of surveillance information that it already had.
Under the legislation, the spy agency was granted unprecedented access to every single American’s internet communications.
But the NSA still had to comply with a number of rules.
It had to keep the contents of the data it was using secret, and it had to retain it for two years.
The law also prohibited the NSA from sharing its information with the foreign governments that have been the targets of American spying.
Finally, the law barred the NSA, and anyone else, from disclosing the NSA’s surveillance program to foreign intelligence agencies, the so-called Five Eyes.
But that last rule was an anomaly.
The government has been able to keep its own data secret, because it’s part of a larger surveillance program that has been overseen by a secretive, unaccountable group of bureaucrats.
When the government has a problem with one of these programs, it can simply ask a special agency called the SIGINT Automation Center, which sits in a nondescript building a couple of blocks from the White House, to find the problem and get it fixed.
The center has been tasked with tracking all the data the NSA collects, and its reports are then sent to the NSA for approval.
If that approval process takes several months, the program is put on hold and the agency is required to begin collecting data again.
But it’s also possible that a foreign government has found a way to gain access to the data that’s being collected and is using it to do harm to the US.
The problem is that these foreign intelligence requests are very hard to detect and can take months or even years to be resolved.
That’s because the US government’s ability to access foreign intelligence data depends on two things: first, that it is able to get it from one of the Five Eyes countries, and second, that the information it’s gathering isn’t being used for any other purpose.
In 2012, a new administration in Washington found itself in a similar position.
After a string of failed attempts to get information from China, the administration began looking for a way in which to get the Chinese government to comply.
They tried to persuade the Chinese, but it didn’t work.
So, the new administration, in a sense, was doing the bidding of the Chinese intelligence services.
The White House didn